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Abstract 
Over the past decade, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance as a result 
of armed conflict has grown to unprecedented levels. The rapid and effective provision of 
such assistance constitutes one of the greatest challenges faced by the international 
community in protecting civilians and other protected persons in times of conflict.  While 
international humanitarian law imposes extensive obligations on the parties to a conflict 
to grant access to humanitarian actors and facilitate the provision of relief assistance, 
these rules are routinely violated. This results in significant and prolonged suffering of 
civilian populations. If the law governing humanitarian assistance is to be better respected, 
those who act unlawfully must be held accountable. One of the most effective mechanisms 
for ensuring such accountability is prosecution of international crimes at the International 
Criminal Court. In its present form, however, there is no provision in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court which provides specifically for the prosecution of the 
unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance in non-international armed conflict. This paper 
argues that this leaves a significant gap in the accountability framework, and examines 
possibilities for reform. 
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I Introduction 
 
In key 2015 reports, both the Secretary-General of the United Nations (“Secretary-
General”) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) identify that the 
provision of rapid and unimpeded humanitarian assistance constitutes one of the most 
significant challenges in ensuring the protection of the civilian population and other 
protected persons during armed conflicts.1 This is not a new challenge, but it is a growing 
one. Over the past decade the number of people in need of international humanitarian 
assistance has tripled, the overwhelming majority of which are civilians affected by 
conflict.2 It is estimated that worldwide, there are 125.3 million people in need of 
humanitarian assistance3 and the ICRC now warns that:4  
 
The international humanitarian sector is at risk of reaching breaking point. The ICRC and 
other impartial humanitarian organisations are facing humanitarian needs on an epic scale 
in an unprecedented number of concurrent crises around the world. 
 
 
One of the greatest challenges faced by humanitarian actors in responding to these crises 
is gaining rapid and unimpeded access to those in need.5 Humanitarian access is a 
fundamental prerequisite to providing effective assistance. The barriers to gaining such 
access, however, are various. The nature of conflict means that reaching those in need is 
always likely to be a significant challenge; active hostilities inevitably make the provision 
of assistance incredibly difficult.  In many cases, however, the challenges to gaining access 
  
1 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict S/2015/453 (2015); and 
International Committee of the Red Cross International humanitarian law and the challenges of 
contemporary armed conflict (October 2015). 
2 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [3]. 
3 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Global Humanitarian Overview 2016: 
A Consolidated Appeal to Support People Affected by Disaster and Conflict (December 2015) at 4. 
4 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 6.  
5 Felix Schwendimann “The legal framework of humanitarian access in armed conflict” (2011) 93 IRRC 993 
at 994; and International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC Q&A and lexicon on humanitarian access (June 
2014) at 1. 
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arise as a result of deliberate obstruction by the parties to the conflict: either through attacks 
on humanitarian workers and facilities, bureaucratic restrictions, interference in the 
delivery of assistance, or as occurs in many situations, through an outright denial of access.6  
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) sets out clear obligations on the parties to a conflict 
in relation to the provision of humanitarian assistance. Parties are required to grant access 
to humanitarian actors and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, unless valid 
reason exists.7 These rules are, however, routinely violated and all too often this is done 
with little or no accountability.8 The Secretary-General has highlighted, therefore, that 
where parties withhold consent to relief operations on arbitrary grounds, there must be 
consequences.9 There remains an “overwhelming need” to ensure that those who violate 
the law are held accountable for their actions; anything less “promotes a culture of impunity 
within which violations flourish”.10 In order to ensure that the law governing humanitarian 
assistance is better respected, it is critical that there is an effective legal framework for 
enforcement of the law and accountability when it is breached.  
 
One of the most important mechanisms for enforcement and accountability of IHL is 
international criminal law (ICL) which encompasses rules that prohibit certain conduct and 
makes perpetrators accountable for violating these rules. In particular, the prosecution of 
  
6 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Humanitarian Assistance in Situations of Armed Conflict: 
Handbook on the International Normative Framework (version 2, December 2014) at 10; and International 
Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 26. 
7 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War 75 UNTS 287 (opened 
for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention IV], arts 23, 54, 55, 
56, 59 and 60; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 12 
December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol I], arts 70 and 71; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 1125 UNTS 609 (opened for signature 12 December 1977, 
entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol II]; arts 14 and 18; and Jean-Marie Henckaerts and 
Louise Doswald-Beck (eds) Customary International Humanitarian Law – Volume 1: Rules (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), r 55.  
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [4]. 
9 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [7]. 
10 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [7]. 
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those who breach IHL at the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an important part of the 
accountability framework. The ICC was set up under the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) with the intention of prosecuting those who commit the 
most serious crimes of international concern, and in doing so put an end to impunity and 
contribute to the prevention of these crimes.11 Its role is particularly important because of 
its ability to prosecute international crimes where domestic courts are unable or 
unwilling.12 
 
Notwithstanding the huge scale of suffering experienced by the civilian population when 
humanitarian assistance is unlawfully obstructed and the increased focus on the need for 
accountability, there is no provision in the Rome Statute which provides specifically for 
the prosecution of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance in non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC). This is despite the inclusion of art 8(2)(b)(xxv), applicable in 
international armed conflicts (IAC), which criminalises the act of “intentionally using 
starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable 
to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the 
Geneva Conventions”.13 The majority of contemporary conflicts are non-international in 
character. This leaves, therefore, a significant gap in the accountability framework.   
 
This paper argues that the Rome Statute in its current form is not sufficiently 
comprehensive so as to provide a robust system for enforcement of the rules governing 
humanitarian assistance in NIAC, and examines possibilities for reform. The discussion 
will proceed first in Part II by providing a background to the discussion:  it outlines the 
concepts of humanitarian assistance and humanitarian access, examines the scale of the 
challenge faced by humanitarian actors in trying to access those in need in NIAC, and the 
impacts of the denial of humanitarian assistance. In Part III it outlines the IHL framework 
governing the provision of humanitarian assistance. Part V examines the possibilities for 
  
11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 2187 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) [Rome Statute], preamble and art 1. 
12 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 17. 
13 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 8(2)(b)(xxv). 
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prosecuting the denial of humanitarian assistance in NIAC under the Rome Statute in its 
current form, and outlines why this regime is insufficiently robust. Finally, in Part V, 
possibilities for reform are discussed.   
 
II Contemporary Conflicts: Humanitarian Crises on an Unprecedented Scale 
 
Armed conflict is the greatest driver of humanitarian need.14 Contemporary conflicts take 
an extreme toll on civilian populations who are often deprived of essential goods and 
services as a result of the devastation caused by conflict.15 Thus, humanitarian assistance 
is essential to meet the most basic needs of those affected by an armed conflict.16 In many 
situations of conflict, humanitarian organisations become the primary providers of essential 
services: food, water, sanitation, health care and education.17  
 
A Defining Humanitarian Assistance and Access 
 
The terms “humanitarian assistance” and “humanitarian access” are not defined in IHL, 
and the terms have not been delineated by an international court or tribunal. Their meanings 
are however generally understood. “Humanitarian assistance” is often used 
interchangeably with other terms such as “humanitarian aid”, “humanitarian relief” and 
“relief action”, and refers to the provision of essential relief supplies to meet the basic 
human needs of those who require protection or assistance in armed conflict: food, clean 
drinking water, clothing, bedding, shelter, medicines and medical care.18 Generally, 
assistance is considered to be “humanitarian” when it is provided in accordance with the 
  
14 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 3, at 3.  
15 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [9]. 
16 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 26. 
17 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 3, at 3.  
18 Netherlands Advisory Committee on Issues of Public International Law Advisory Report on Humanitarian 
Assistance (August 2014) at 9; Heike Spieker “Humanitarian Assistance, Access in Armed Conflict and 
Occupation” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (March 2013, online ed) at [2]; 
International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 28; and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 
above n 6, at 13. 
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core principles of humanitarian action: humanity, impartiality, neutrality and 
independence.19 These principles, originally derived from the Statutes of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies,20 formally enshrined in two General Assembly Resolutions21 
and committed to by many humanitarian organisations,22 while not strictly legally binding, 
are viewed by humanitarian actors as providing the foundations for humanitarian action.23 
The principle of humanity relates to the humanitarian imperative and the need to alleviate 
and redress human suffering wherever it is found.24 “Impartiality” requires assistance to be 
provided on the basis of need without discriminating as to “nationality, race, religious 
beliefs, class or political opinions”.25 Neutrality requires that assistance is provided without 
engaging in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a “political, racial, religious or 
ideological nature”.26 Finally, independence requires that humanitarian action must be 
autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may 
hold.27  
 
“Humanitarian access” is generally recognised by humanitarian actors as encompassing the 
“dual dimensions” of both humanitarian actors’ ability to reach affected people and of 
affected populations’ ability to access humanitarian assistance and services.28 
Humanitarian organisations and other international actors stress that rapid and unimpeded 
  
19 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (adopted by the 25th International 
Conference of the Red Cross at Geneva in 1986, amended in 1995 and 2006), preamble; Strengthening of the 
coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations GA Res 46/182, A/Res/46/182 
(1991) at [2]; and Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United 
Nations GA Res 58/114, A/Res/58/114 (2004) at preamble.  
20 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above n 19, preamble. 
21 GA Res 46/182, above n 19, at [2]; and GA Res 58/114, above n 19, at preamble. 
22 See International Committee of the Red Cross Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (April 2014). 
23 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA on Message: Humanitarian 
Principles (June 2012) at 2.  
24 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above n 19, preamble. 
25 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above n 19, preamble. 
26 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, above n 19, preamble. 
27 GA Res 58/114, above n 19, at preamble; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, above n 23, at 1. 
28 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OCHA on Message: Humanitarian 
Access (version I, April 2010) at 1. 
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humanitarian access is a “fundamental prerequisite” to providing effective humanitarian 
assistance.29  
 
B Challenges Facing Humanitarian Assistance  
 
In many cases, the key barriers to providing humanitarian assistance are security related. 
When hostilities are ongoing it is extremely difficult to reach populations in need, 
especially where the safety of humanitarian personnel cannot be guaranteed.30 The nature 
of hostilities in contemporary NIAC brings new levels of complexity to these long-standing 
security concerns. Conflicts are becoming more protracted and have large geographical 
span, often “spilling over” into neighbouring territories and countries.31 This creates a 
significant challenge for humanitarian organisations that must attempt to reach a huge 
number of civilians spread over expansive areas. The increasing incidence of insurgent 
warfare also means that conflicts are fought in areas which are often densely populated, 
creating additional security concerns.32 Complexity also arises in NIAC as a result of the 
multitude of parties and their conflictual relations.33 In particular, on the non-state side a 
myriad of armed groups frequently take part in the fighting. Often the structure of the chain 
of command of these groups is difficult to ascertain, and this poses a challenge both in 
terms of security and for engaging with such groups.34  
 
  
29 GA Res 46/182, above n 19, at [6]; International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 26; Jean-
Maurice Ripert “EU Presidency Statement – United Nations ECOSOC: Timely humanitarian assistance, 
including disaster risk reduction” (European Presidency Statement, 15 July 2008); “Thematic Areas: 
Humanitarian Access” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
<www.unhca.org>; Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 13; and Schwendimann, 
above n 5, at 994. 
30 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 5, at 2. 
31 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 6; and United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 3, at 3. 
32 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 29. 
33 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 6. 
34 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 6. 
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In some cases, however, it is not just these practical challenges that impede the provision 
of effective humanitarian assistance, but deliberate obstruction by the parties to the conflict. 
Humanitarian assistance may be intentionally obstructed by the deliberate targeting of 
humanitarian workers and facilities, theft of assets, blockades, bureaucratic restrictions 
(such as delays in issuing of visas for humanitarian personnel), interference in the delivery 
of assistance, or by an outright denial of access.35 In some cases, the obstruction of 
humanitarian relief efforts may be part of a military strategy aimed at depriving the 
adversary and/or the civilian population of essential supplies.36 In other cases, it can be a 
result of complex political tensions. Humanitarian activities are sometimes denied because 
they are perceived as a threat to state sovereignty or governmental control.37 There has 
been a growing perception in recent years that humanitarian aid has become more 
politicised.38 Discussion around the notions of “humanitarian intervention” and the 
“responsibility to protect”, as well as an increasing number of international operations 
which have followed “integrated” approaches, which combine political, military and 
humanitarian objectives, have raised doubts in some contexts about whether humanitarian 
actors are driven purely by humanitarian purposes.39 The ICRC notes that this has led some 
parties to armed conflicts to restrict or forbid humanitarian assistance.40 
 
C The Impacts of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance  
 
The denial of humanitarian access and assistance has tragic consequences for civilian 
populations in conflict zones. In situations in which the population is already suffering 
desperate levels of need, the blocking of assistance by parties to the conflict results in 
immense suffering. As noted by the Secretary-General, “[a]ccess for humanitarian 
organi[s]ations is not simply a technical requirement or bureaucratic decision for 
  
35 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 10; and International Committee of the Red 
Cross, above n 1, at 26. 
36 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 5, at 2. 
37 Schwendimann, above n 5, at 994. 
38 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 26. 
39 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 5, at 21; and Schwendimann, above n 5, at 994. 
40 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 5, at 2l.  
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Governments; the denial of access prolongs suffering and kills people”.41 The conflict in 
Syria in particular has brought renewed attention to the impacts of the denial of 
humanitarian access. Now in its fifth year, the conflict has produced what the United 
Nations (UN) has called the “biggest humanitarian emergency of our era”.42 As at January 
2016, it is estimated that 13.5 million Syrians, including 5.5 million children, are in need 
of immediate humanitarian assistance.43 The crisis has continued to worsen as parties on 
all sides of the conflict continue to obstruct the provision of assistance.44 
 
The Syrian government in particular has systematically impeded the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, both through placing severe restrictions on humanitarian access, 
or denying such access altogether.45 On many occasions, the Syrian government has 
blocked humanitarian assistance at its borders or required UN convoys to travel indirect 
routes through many checkpoints to reach people in need.46 As at 30 November 2015, of 
the 91 requests made by the UN in 2015 to provide humanitarian assistance, only 27 had 
been approved, and of those, only 13 convoys had been completed. 47 Of the 14 remaining, 
half of those were unable to proceed owing to a lack of approval from Syrian security 
forces.48 If these convoys were able to proceed, more than 282,000 people in hard-to-reach 
and besieged locations could be reached.49 Administrative procedures also continue to 
  
41 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [39]. 
42 The United Nations Refugee Agency “Needs soar as number of Syrian refugees tops 3 million” (press 
release, 29 August 2014). 
43 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 3, at 4; and International 
Committee of the Red Cross “Syria: Humanitarian situation deteriorating as winter approaches” (News 
Release, 3 December 2015). 
44 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 
(2014) and 2191 (2014) S/2015/962 (2015) at [30]. 
45 Julia Brooks “Is there a Right to Humanitarian Assistance?” (15 July 2015) Advanced Training Program 
on Humanitarian Action <http://atha.se>. 
46 Anne Richard, US Department of State “Humanitarian Assistance and the Syria Crisis” (Remarks, 3 
November 2013). 
47 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 
(2014) and 2191 (2014), above n 44, at [36]. 
48 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 
(2014) and 2191 (2014), above n 44, at [36]. 
49 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 
(2014) and 2191 (2014), above n 44, at [36]. 
  
 
14 
 
delay or limit the delivery of assistance. Humanitarian agencies face significant problems 
in obtaining visas for their staff.50 Other bureaucratic processes also hamper the delivery 
of assistance. For example, food import regulations require that import documents for 
humanitarian food assistance need to be notarised by the Syrian embassy in the country of 
the product’s origin, creating significant delays.51 The government also regularly prevents 
international humanitarian workers from travelling within Syria, and legitimate Syrian aid 
agencies are often blocked from working with the international community.52 
 
It is not just government forces who have obstructed the delivery of assistance, however. 
Opposition fighters have prevented aid from reaching those in need, diverted supplies and 
carried out acts of violence against humanitarian personnel.53All the parties to the conflict 
have also employed siege warfare widely, “encircl[ing] densely populated areas, 
preventing civilians from leaving, and blocking humanitarian access”.54 The sieges 
imposed have become longer and consequently, more harsh.55 The result is that up to 4.5 
million people in Syria are in “hard-to-reach” areas, including nearly 400,000 people in 15 
besieged locations who do not have access to aid they urgently need.56 The UN stated in 
January 2016 that it had received credible reports of people starving to death in Madaya, a 
town under siege by Syrian forces.57 
 
  
50 Oxfam Failing Syria: Assessing the impact of UN Security Council resolutions in protecting and assisting 
Civilians in Syria (March 2015) at 13; and Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security 
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014) and 2191 (2014), above n 44, at [39]. 
51 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 
(2014) and 2191 (2014), above n 44, at [38]. 
52 Oxfam, above n 50, at 13; and Richard, above n 46. 
53 Richard, above n 46. 
54 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/30/48 
(2015) at [100].  
55 Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic A/HRC/28/69 
(2015) at [11]. 
56 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs “Joint Statement on hard-to-reach and 
besieged communities in Syria” (Joint Statement, 7 January 2016).  
57 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, above n 56. 
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The situation in Syria is a demonstration of how the policy of the obstruction of 
humanitarian assistance can turn a “civil conflict and disaster … into a regional crisis of 
historic proportions”.58 It highlights the sheer scale of suffering inflicted on the civilian 
population as a result of the systematic denial of supplies essential for their survival. This 
is not unique to the Syrian conflict, however. The challenges faced in gaining humanitarian 
access and providing effective humanitarian assistance present a significant barrier to the 
protection of the civilian population in nearly every current conflict. The Secretary-General 
has stated that gaining humanitarian access and providing much-needed assistance is a key 
concern currently in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria and Yemen.59 
 
III Humanitarian Assistance in International Humanitarian Law 
 
The obligations of parties to an armed conflict in relation to humanitarian access and 
assistance are governed by IHL, which “envisages that humanitarian assistance will be 
needed and regulates its provision”.60 
 
A An Overview of the Legal Framework 
 
The rules governing humanitarian assistance are found in the Fourth Geneva Convention 
(GC IV),61 the two Additional Protocols (AP I and AP II),62 and customary international 
law. Different legal regimes apply depending on whether the assistance is offered in a 
situation of occupation, IAC or NIAC. The key principles, however, are the same.63 Firstly, 
  
58 Richard, above n 46. 
59 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [10] - [26]. 
60 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 26. 
61 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7. 
62 Additional Protocol I, above n 7; and Additional Protocol II, above n 7.  
63 Emanuela-Chiara Gillard “The law regulating cross-border relief operations” (2013) 95 IRRC 351 at 355; 
and International Committee of the Red Cross International humanitarian law and the challenges of 
contemporary armed conflict (October 2015) at 27. 
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the primary responsibility for the basic needs of the civilian population rests with states 
and parties to the conflict.64 Secondly, where a party to the conflict is unable or unwilling 
to meet these needs, states and humanitarian organisations can offer to carry out relief 
actions that are “humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any 
adverse distinction”.65 Such an offer cannot be considered to constitute interference in the 
conflict or an unfriendly act.66 Thirdly, consent from the parties to the conflict must be 
obtained before such actions can be carried out.67 Consent, however, must not be arbitrarily 
denied.68 Finally, once relief actions have been agreed to, parties to the conflict and other 
relevant states must facilitate the rapid and unimpeded passage of relief consignments, 
equipment and personnel.69 
 
1 Situations of Occupation 
The obligations of parties towards the civilian population are most extensive during a 
situation of occupation. Provisions in GC IV70 and AP I71 establish a clear obligation on 
the part of the occupying power to ensure that the basic needs of the population under its 
control are met.72 The occupying power has the duty to ensure “to the fullest extent of the 
means available to it” the provision of food and medical supplies to the civilian 
  
64 Gillard, above n 63, at 355; International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 27; Schwendimann, 
above n 5, at 996; Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 
1, at [39]; and GA Res 46/182, above n 19, at [4]. 
65 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1); and Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 18(2). 
66 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1); and Ruth Abril Stoffels “Legal regulation of humanitarian 
assistance in armed conflict: Achievements and gaps” (2004) 86 IRRC 515 at 533. 
67 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1); and Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 18(2). 
68 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts: Volume XII CDDH/II/SR.87 (Geneva, 1974 - 1977) at 336; Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds) Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Geneva, 1987) at 819; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55; and Report of the 
Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [39]. 
69 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(2); and Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55. 
70 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, arts 55, 56, 59 and 60.  
71 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, arts 70 and 71.  
72 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 30. 
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population,73 as well as clothing, bedding, means of shelter, objects necessary for religious 
worship and other supplies essential to survival of the civilian population.74 If the 
occupying power is not in a position to fulfil these duties to the civilian population, then it 
“shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said population” and it must “facilitate these 
schemes by all the means at its disposal”.75 Relief personnel must be respected, protected, 
and assisted to the fullest extent practicable in carrying out their mission.76 Third states are 
also under an obligation to grant the free passage of relief consignments on their way to 
the occupied territory.77  
 
2 International Armed Conflict 
In the case of an IAC, the provision of humanitarian assistance is regulated by GC IV78 
and AP I.79 Unlike in a situation of occupation, parties are under no obligation to provide 
direct humanitarian assistance to the civilian population on the territory under their 
control.80 They do, however, have certain duties towards the civilian population. 
 
Pursuant to GC IV, parties and other relevant states must allow the free passage of all 
consignments of medical and hospital stores and objects necessary for religious worship 
intended for civilians in the territory of another state, even if the latter is its adversary.81 
Free passage for consignments of essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics for children 
under fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases must also be allowed.82 The scope of 
  
73 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 55. 
74 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 69(1). 
75 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 59. 
76 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 71; and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 
33. 
77 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 59. 
78 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, arts 23 and 54. 
79 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, arts 70 and 71.  
80 Brooks, above n 45. 
81 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 23(1). 
82 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 23(1). 
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GC IV is limited, however, as it does not impose obligations on states to allow for 
humanitarian access to their own population.83 
 
AP I significantly strengthens this regime, and applies to all civilian populations. Where 
civilians are not adequately provided with supplies essential to their survival, relief actions 
which are “of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature, and which are conducted 
without any adverse distinction” shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the parties 
concerned.84 Offers of relief shall not be regarded as “interference in the armed conflict or 
as unfriendly acts”.85 Once relief action has been approved, the parties must “allow and 
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage” of the relief consignments, equipment and 
personnel86 and respect and protect the humanitarian personnel.87  
 
These provisions largely reflect the position at customary international law. The ICRC’s 
study of customary international law identifies that, in both IAC and NIAC, the parties to 
the conflict must “allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of the humanitarian 
relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without adverse 
distinction, subject to their right of control”.88 Therefore, the obligations on parties are 
broadly the same, even where state parties have not ratified AP I.  
  
83 Stoffels, above n 66, at 519; and Phoebe Wynn-Pope “Humanitarian access in international humanitarian 
law: the case of Syria and Security Council Resolution 2139 (2014)” in Jadranka Petrovic (ed) Accountability 
for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: Essays in Honour of Tim McCormack (Routledge, New 
York, 2015) 117 at 121. 
84 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1). 
85 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1). 
86 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(2). 
87 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 71(2). 
88 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55. 
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3 Non-International Armed Conflict 
In the case of a NIAC, humanitarian assistance is regulated by Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions (CA 3)89 and in some cases AP II.90 The treaty law regime in NIAC 
is weaker than the framework for IAC.91 No explicit rights or duties relating to 
humanitarian assistance are established in CA 3, though it does establish that as a minimum 
measure of protection, persons taking no active part in hostilities “shall in all circumstances 
be treated humanely”.92 CA 3 also establishes the right of initiative - impartial humanitarian 
bodies may offer their services to the parties to the conflict.93 
 
AP II provides more explicit protection for humanitarian assistance.94 Article 18 reinforces 
the right of humanitarian initiative and establishes that if the civilian population is suffering 
undue hardship as a result of a lack of supplies essential to its survival, relief actions which 
are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature, and which are conducted without 
any adverse distinction “shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting 
Party concerned”.95 While AP II does not cover all forms of NIAC, only those where 
organised armed groups “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them 
to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”,96 
  
89 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 75 UNTS 31 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva 
Convention I], art 3; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 75 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention II], art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 75 UNTS 135 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 
[Geneva Convention III], art 3; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War 75 UNTS 287 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva 
Convention IV], art 3 [Common Article 3]. 
90 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, arts 14 and 18. 
91 Spieker, above n 18, at [27]. 
92 Common Article 3, above n 89, art 3(1). 
93 Common Article 3, above n 89, art 3(2). 
94 Rebecca Barber “Facilitating humanitarian assistance in international humanitarian and human rights law” 
(2009) 91 IRRC 371 at 385. 
95 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, arts 18(1) and 18(2). 
96 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 1(1). 
  
 
20 
 
in practice states do not appear to make this distinction in the context of humanitarian 
assistance.97 
 
The customary international law norms governing humanitarian assistance in NIAC mirror 
those applicable in IAC, strengthening the treaty regime.98 The norms at customary 
international law are particularly significant where the state party to the conflict has not 
ratified AP II.  
 
B Consent 
 
It is clear that the obligations on parties to facilitate humanitarian access and assistance are 
extensive. The main element of complexity in the IHL regime, however, is consent. In 
situations of occupation, if the occupying power is unable to provide for the population, it 
is under an obligation to agree to the provision of humanitarian assistance.99 In both IAC 
and NIAC, however, the consent of the relevant party is a prerequisite to the provision of 
humanitarian assistance.  In IAC, the provision of humanitarian assistance is “subject to 
the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions”100 and in NIAC it is “subject 
to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned”.101 The need for consent is 
reaffirmed in the ICRC’s customary law study.102 It is this requirement that has attracted 
the most scrutiny in recent scholarship. 
 
1 Arbitrary Denial of Consent 
While consent for the provision of humanitarian assistance is required in both IAC and 
NIAC, parties do not have absolute and unlimited freedom to refuse consent to relief 
  
97 Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 33. 
98 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55. 
99 Geneva Convention IV, above n 7, art 59. 
100 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1). 
101 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, arts 18(1) and 18(2). 
102 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55. 
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actions.103 There is a clearly established principle that parties must not refuse to grant 
access or allow humanitarian operations on an arbitrary basis.104 The arbitrary denial of 
humanitarian access or assistance is a violation of IHL.105 
 
While the principle is clear, however, to clearly outline what constitutes arbitrary denial is 
more difficult. There is no agreed definition of “arbitrary denial”. The term is not defined 
in any treaty and to date this question has not been addressed by any tribunal, human rights 
mechanism or fact-finding body.106  This makes application of the rule particularly 
challenging.107 What can be noted with some certainty, however, is that there will be very 
few situations in which it will be valid to withhold consent. Such situations might include 
where the state has sufficient capacity to provide relief, where the actors offering assistance 
are not neutral or impartial, or for reasons of military necessity, for example, where 
humanitarian personnel could hamper military operations or relief is being diverted by 
belligerents.108 Beyond this, denial of consent is likely to be arbitrary. 
 
Certainly, it is clear that denial will be arbitrary if it violates the state’s other obligations at 
IHL, in particular, if withholding consent would amount to a violation on the prohibition 
  
103 Schwendimann, above n 5, at 998; and Brooks, above n 45. 
104 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International 
law applicable in Armed Conflicts: Volume XII, above n 68, at 336; Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann, 
above n 68, at 819; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 55; and Report of the Secretary-General on 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [39]. See also other soft law instruments: United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
E/CN.4/1998.53/Add.2 (1998); Institute of International Law Resolution on Humanitarian Assistance 
(sixteenth commission, Bruges session 2003); and Council of Europe Council of Europe Recommendation 6 
(2006) of the Committee of Ministers to member states on internally displaced persons (2006). 
105 Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, above n 1, at [39] and 
[61]. 
106 Gillard, above n 63, at 360. 
107 Gillard, above n 63, at 355; and International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 360. 
108 Gillard, above n 63, at 355; International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 360; and Cedric 
Ryngaert “Humanitarian Assistance and the Conundrum of Consent: A Legal Perspective” (2013) 5 
Amsterdam Law Forum 5 at 9. 
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of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare.109 Another example would be withholding 
consent to medical relief operations on the basis that medical supplies could be used to 
treat enemy combatants - a clear breach of the fundamental rule under IHL that all wounded 
and sick must receive, to the fullest extent practicable, the medical care required by their 
condition.110  It has also been suggested that withholding consent that is “likely to endanger 
the fundamental human rights” of affected civilians may be considered arbitrary.111 In 
many cases, determining whether consent has been arbitrarily withheld requires a balancing 
of legitimate military considerations with humanitarian ones. It has, therefore, been 
suggested that the principle of proportionality under human rights law may offer 
guidance.112 A refusal in a situation where the suffering of the civilian population would 
outweigh even legitimate military concerns would be considered arbitrary.113  
 
Further research and refinement of this principle is necessary. The United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is currently, at the request of the Secretary-
General, working on creating clarifying guidelines on the principle of arbitrary denial, and 
these will be particularly useful for providing further guidance on this issue.114 
 
  
109 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 54(1); Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, above n 7, r 53; Gillard, above 
n 63, at 355; International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 360; Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 26; Schwendimann, above n 5, at 999; and Barber, above n 94, at 387. 
110 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 10; Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 7; Henckaerts and Doswald-
Beck, above n 7, r 110; and Gillard, above n 63, at 361. 
111 Gillard, above n 63, at 361. 
112 This is the approach taken in the: International Institute of Humanitarian Law San Remo Manual on 
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Livorno, 12 June 1994) at para 102(b); and Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University HPCR Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (Bern, 15 May 2009) at r 157(b). See also Michael Bothe “Relief 
Actions: The Position of the Recipient State” in Frtis Kalshoven (ed) Assisting the Victims of Armed Conflict 
and Other Disasters: Papers Delivered at the International Conference on Humanitarian Assistance in 
Armed Conflict, The Hague, 22 – 24 June 1988 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989) 91 at 95. 
113 Gillard, above n 63, at 362. 
114 Gillard, above n 63, at 355; and International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 360. 
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2 Consent and Non-State Armed Groups 
In IAC, AP I requires the consent of “the Parties concerned in such relief actions”.115 This 
includes the state party in whose territory the operations will be implemented, any states 
from whose territory a relief action is undertaken, and states through whose territory the 
relief operations must transit.116 The position in NIAC, however, is more complex. In 
particular, a divergence of views exists on the question of whether the consent of a state is 
still required in a NIAC for the provision of assistance to areas no longer under 
governmental control. Governmental reluctance to grant consent is likely to be greatest 
when relief is destined for insurgent-controlled areas, making this question particularly 
pertinent.117 The Syrian conflict has brought new rigour to this debate, and prompted by 
the government’s consistent refusal to grant consent, it has been argued that only the 
consent of the non-state group is required to access areas no longer under state control.118  
 
The orthodox position is that state consent is required, even when humanitarian assistance 
is being provided to areas outside state control. CA 3 provides that humanitarian assistance 
may be offered to the “Parties to the conflict”, but is silent on the question of whose consent 
is required.119 AP II, however, explicitly requires the consent of the “High Contracting 
Party concerned” to relief actions, and it is argued that it is difficult to read this as referring 
to anyone other than the state concerned.120 This is the interpretation adopted by the ICRC 
which states that “consent should be sought from the State in whose territory a NIAC is 
taking place, including for relief activities to be undertaken in areas over which the State 
has lost control”121 as well as a number of other commentators who argue that this position 
largely reflects state practice.122 
  
115 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 70(1). 
116 Gillard, above n 63, at 364. 
117 Yoram Dinstein Non-International Conflicts in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2014) at 152.  
118 See for example: Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier “Consent to humanitarian access: An obligation triggered 
by territorial control, not States’ rights” (2014) 96 IRRC 207. 
119 Common Article 3, above n 89, art 3(2). 
120 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 18(2); and Stoffels, above n 66, at 535. 
121 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 28. 
122 See for example: Gillard, above n 63, at 355; and Schwendimann, above n 5, at 1001. 
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Increasingly, this interpretation has been challenged by those who reason that IHL stresses 
the obligations of parties to a conflict to allow and facilitate humanitarian assistance, and 
as such it does not require a strict interpretation of the consent requirement, but instead a 
focus on the needs of the civilian population.123 These commentators argue that in light of 
the principle of the equality of belligerents, CA 3’s silence as to whose consent is required 
puts state and non-state groups on an equal footing, and allows relief operations in territory 
no longer under state control to be carried out with the consent of the non-state group 
alone.124 While AP II requires the consent of the “High Contracting Party concerned” it 
has been argued that in many cases AP II does not apply where the state is not a party to 
the protocol, and that even under AP II state consent is only required if relief consignments 
have to transit through state-controlled territory, otherwise the state could not be considered 
to be “concerned”.125 While some contend that this view is not endorsed by States, the 
number of third States that have either supported cross-border assistance or acquiesced in 
circumstances such as Myanmar and Sudan, may suggest otherwise.126 The legal position 
remains contested. From a practical perspective the agreement of non-state armed groups 
is required to implement humanitarian operations safely. Whether or not this replaces the 
legal requirement to also gain state consent, however, is unclear. 
 
  
123 Jérémie Labbé and Tilman Rodenhauser “Cross-border Humanitarian Aid in Syria has Legal Basis but 
Few Precedents” (10 May 2013) IPI Global Observatory <http://theglobalobservatory.org>.  
124 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 28; Gillard, above n 63, at 355; and Tilman 
Rodenhäuser and Jonathan Somer “The Security Council and Humanitarian Relief in Opposition-Held 
Territories” (12 August 2014) EJIL:Talk! Blog of the European Journal of International Law <www. 
ejiltalk.org>.  
125 This view has been supported by the former President of the International Humanitarian Fact Finding 
Commission and co-author of an authoritative commentary on the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, Michael Bothe, in an unpublished study provided to the UN. See Kersten Knipp “Assad cannot 
legally deny humanitarian aid, study finds” Deutsche Welle (online ed, Bonn, 7 May 2014).  
126 Rodenhäuser and Somer, above n 124. 
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3 Consequences of Arbitrarily Denying Consent 
While the rule at customary international law prohibiting the arbitrary denial of consent to 
humanitarian operations is well-established, consensus on the legal consequences of the 
violation of this norm is not.  
 
(a) Security Council Action 
It is clear that where a party denies consent to humanitarian operations in breach of its 
obligations under IHL, the Security Council may circumvent the consent requirement by 
passing a binding resolution requiring the parties concerned to consent to humanitarian 
relief operations.127 On a small number of occasions, the Security Council has taken such 
action. Generally, this has taken the form of resolutions which require the parties to create 
security conditions conducive to the delivery of assistance, rather than actually requiring 
the affected state to allow access.128 In this respect then, the Security Council’s response 
to the situation in Syria has marked an important departure from previous practice. For the 
first time, the Security Council has, in a number of resolutions, demanded that all parties 
allow rapid, safe and unhindered access for UN humanitarian agencies, including across 
conflict lines and across borders.129 
 
The implementation of these resolutions has, however, been less than comprehensive. In 
the November 2015 report on the implementation of resolutions 2139, 2165 and 2191, the 
Secretary-General noted that the delivery of humanitarian access has remained extremely 
  
127 Gillard, above n 63, at 359; Yoram Dinstein “The Right to Humanitarian Assistance” (2000) 54 Naval 
Law Coll Rev 77 at 86. 
128 For example Bosnia and Herzegovina: Security Council Resolution 752 SC Res 752, S/Res/752 (1992); 
Security Council Resolution 757 SC Res 757, S/Res/757 (1992); and Security Council Resolution 770 SC 
Res 770, S/Res/770 (1992); Somalia: On measures to create a secure environment for humanitarian relief 
operations in Somalia SC Res 794, S/Res/794 (1992); and Northern Iraq: Security Council Resolution 688 
SC Res 688, S/Res/688 (1991). See also Gillard, above n 63, at 378; Netherlands Advisory Committee on 
Issues of Public International Law, above n 18, at 23; and Dinstein, above n 127, at 86. 
129 Security Council Resolution 2139 SC Res 2139, S/Res/2139 (2014) at [6]; Resolution on the humanitarian 
situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism SC Res 2165, 
S/Res/2165 (2014) at [2]; and Resolution on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the 
establishment of a monitoring mechanism SC Res 2191, S/Res/2191 (2014) at [2]. 
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challenging. Both government forces and non-state armed groups continue to obstruct 
humanitarian access and assistance and the situation is not improving.130 The level of 
access for humanitarian agencies and the inability of those in need to obtain essential 
humanitarian supplies and services “remains unacceptable”.131 As the situation in Syria has 
demonstrated, therefore, Security Council circumvention of the consent requirement is not 
necessarily a wholly effective enforcement mechanism. 
 
(b) Unauthorised Relief Operations 
The more difficult question is whether, in situations where consent is denied arbitrary, it is 
lawful for states or humanitarian organisations to conduct unauthorised relief operations. 
Again, this question has been the subject of considerable recent discussion in the context 
of the Syrian conflict. As the humanitarian crisis in Syria escalated, in large part as a result 
of what has been widely recognised as the arbitrary denial of consent to humanitarian 
assistance by the government,132 some humanitarian organisations (notably Médecins Sans 
Frontières) continued clandestine operations without authorisation, sparking considerable 
debate.133 
 
Traditionally, literature on this issue has focussed on whether, in situations where consent 
is arbitrarily withheld, unauthorised relief operations are permissible on the basis either of 
states’ duty under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (CA 1)134 to “ensure 
  
130 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139(2014), 
2165(2014) and 2191(2014), above n 44, at [33] – [45] and [60]. 
131 Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139(2014), 
2165(2014) and 2191(2014), above n 44, at [60]. 
132 See for example: comments from the Valerie Amos, UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian 
Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator who has described the “continued withholding of consent to cross-
border and cross-line relief operations” as “arbitrary and unjustified” in “There is no legal barrier to UN 
cross-border operations in Syria” The Guardian (online ed, London, 28 April 2014). 
133 Brooks, above n 45. 
134 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field 75 UNTS 31 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva 
Convention I], art 1; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea 75 UNTS 85 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention II], art 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
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respect” for IHL, or on the grounds of counter-measures or necessity. It is generally 
acknowledged, however, that in most situations it is unlikely that any of these grounds will 
provide legal justification for an unauthorised relief operation.135 First, it is widely agreed 
that CA 1 cannot be relied upon as a basis for breaching other rules of international law 
and as such, it cannot justify the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity which 
results from unauthorised operations.136 In regards to countermeasures, carrying out 
unauthorised relief operations cannot be considered a lawful countermeasure because 
firstly, such operations do not serve the purpose of a counter-measure - they are a 
performance of the obligations of the state, rather than an inducement for the state to 
comply with its obligations.137 Secondly, countermeasures may only be invoked by a state 
or international organisation directly affected by the violation.138 The harm suffered by the 
state or organisation whose offer of assistance has been rejected is minimal, it is the civilian 
population who suffers.139 Finally, necessity may be invoked by a state or international 
organisation (1) if an otherwise wrongful act was the only way for it to safeguard an 
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; (2) the act does not seriously impair 
an essential interest of the injured state or of the international community; and (3) the act 
is the only way of preserving the essential interest.140 Certainly, preventing suffering of the 
civilian population could be considered an essential interest of the international 
  
Prisoners of War 75 UNTS 135 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 
[Geneva Convention III], art 1; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times 
of War 75 UNTS 287 (opened for signature 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva 
Convention IV], art 1; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1125 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 12 
December 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) [Additional Protocol I], art 1(4) [Common Article 1]. 
135 See for example: Gillard, above n 63, at 355; Ryngaert, above n 108, at 12; and Netherlands Advisory 
Committee on Issues of Public International Law, above n 18, at 22. 
136 Gillard, above n 63, at 371. 
137 International Law Commission Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts A/56/10 (2001), 
art 49; International Law Commission Responsibility of International Organisations A/66/10 (2011), art 51; 
Gillard, above n 63, at 372; and Stoffels, above n 66, at 536. 
138 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, above n 137, art 49; and Responsibility of 
International Organisations, above n 137, art 51. 
139 Gillard, above n 63, at 372; and Stoffels, above n 66, at 536. 
140 Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, above n 137, art 25; and Responsibility of 
International Organisations, above n 137, art 25.  
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community. In some situations, therefore necessity could be invoked to justify a one-off 
relief operation to a population in extreme need where no alternatives existed.141 In such a 
case, while the unauthorised operation would impair the essential interest of territorial 
integrity, this would not inevitably be to the serious degree precluded by the rule. Necessity 
would not, however, justify unauthorised operations on a wider basis.142 As a general rule, 
therefore, unauthorised operations will not be legal. 
 
More recently, however, debate has focussed on whether a new rule of customary law has 
formed which, in line with other trends in international law such as the development of the 
“responsibility to protect”, downplays or dispenses altogether with the requirement of 
consent, allowing unauthorised humanitarian operations where consent has been arbitrarily 
denied.143 Authors have pointed to the increasingly strong emphasis that has been placed 
on the obligations of states to facilitate humanitarian action in recent General Assembly 
and Security Council resolutions, as well as the lack of international response to 
unauthorised aid operations as evidence that an international norm is developing that 
supports the legality of such operations.144 Notably, in 2014, a group of legal experts 
pronounced in an open letter published in The Guardian that due to Syria’s arbitrary denial 
of humanitarian access “there is no legal barrier to the UN directly undertaking cross-
border operations and supporting NGOs to undertake them as well” arguing that, “where 
consent is withheld for arbitrary reasons, the operation is lawful without consent”.145 
 
This approach is far from being universally accepted, however. The argument that state 
consent is no longer significant or required is not generally seen to be an accurate reflection 
of current state practice and opinio juris.146 The ICRC’s 2004 study of customary 
  
141 Gillard, above n 63, at 373; and Stoffels, above n 66, at 373. 
142 Gillard, above n 63, at 373; and Stoffels, above n 66 at 373. 
143 International Committee of the Red Cross, above n 1, at 27; Ryngaert, above n 108, at 13; and Barber, 
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international law recognises state consent as a necessary requirement,147 and the ICRC 
restated this position more recently, reinforcing that “what is clear … is that the consent of 
the parties to the conflict must be sought and obtained before impartial humanitarian 
organisations can operate and undertake humanitarian activities”.148 Furthermore, even if 
consent was no longer a legal requirement, unauthorised operations pose significant safety 
concerns. Humanitarian actors are unarmed, and rely on negotiation and trust to move 
through conflict zones.149 Any perception that humanitarian actors will not genuinely seek 
to gain consent would likely hinder the work of humanitarian organisations in all 
contexts.150 It seems clear, therefore, that to date “a ‘right to access’ has not crystallised in 
customary international law”.151 Agreement of the state concerned remains a mandatory 
precondition. 
 
C Conclusion on the Legal Framework 
  
IHL imposes extensive obligations on the parties to a conflict to grant access to 
humanitarian organisations where humanitarian assistance is required. While there is 
ongoing debate as to firstly, the requirement for state consent for the provision of assistance 
to areas outside state control in NIAC, and secondly the legality of unauthorised operations 
where consent is arbitrarily withheld, as a general rule consent from the parties is required 
before humanitarian operations may take place. Importantly however, parties must not 
deny consent arbitrarily. To do so is a breach of IHL.  
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IV Prosecuting the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance in Non-International 
Armed Conflict 
 
While IHL imposes rigorous obligations on parties to ensure full and effective 
humanitarian access and assistance, these rules are routinely violated. The biggest 
challenge faced by IHL is that it should be better respected.152 As such, the Secretary-
General has highlighted that “protecting [those in need] from harm, and preserving their 
dignity, in particular by upholding international law and seeking accountability for 
violations, should be at the very top of the international community’s agenda”.153 
 
A International Criminal Prosecution as an Enforcement Mechanism for 
International Humanitarian Law 
 
One of the most important mechanisms available for ensuring such accountability is the 
prosecution for breaches of IHL as international crimes.154 The credibility of IHL and its 
effective implementation relies in large part on the ability of the international community 
to hold those who act unlawfully criminally responsible. Breaches of IHL may constitute 
any one of the three core international crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Most directly linked to underlying IHL norms, however, are war crimes. War 
crimes attach criminal liability to the most serious breaches of IHL: those listed as “grave 
breaches” under the Geneva Conventions (“GCs”) and AP I, as well as other serious 
breaches of IHL to which individual criminal responsibility attaches, either under an 
international instrument or at customary international law.155 
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In ensuring prosecution for such crimes, the ICC plays a particularly critical role. The Court 
has jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of international concern”156 with the 
intention of “put[ting] an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.157 The ICC has the ability to prosecute, even 
where national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so,158 and as such the existence 
of the ICC has signalled the seriousness with which the international community seeks to 
affirm accountability and responsibility for international crimes, and has “raised global 
expectations that impunity for atrocity is no longer acceptable”.159 
 
B Possibilities for Prosecution under the Current Regime 
 
If those who unlawfully deny humanitarian assistance are to be held accountable, there 
must be a comprehensive legal regime allowing for the enforcement of individual criminal 
responsibility for these violations. The Rome Statute in its current form, however, fails to 
establish a sufficiently comprehensive framework for accountability.  
 
The denial of humanitarian assistance is not listed as a grave breach of the GCs or AP I. 
Neither the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) nor the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) made specific provision for violations 
relating to humanitarian assistance (though neither statute provided an exhaustive list of 
war crimes).160 Finally, and most importantly, there is no specific war crime addressing the 
denial of humanitarian access or assistance in NIAC in the Rome Statute. This is despite 
  
156 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 1. 
157 Rome Statute, above n 11, preamble. 
158 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 17; and Antonio Cassese “On the Current Trends towards Criminal 
Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law” (1998) 9 EJIL 2 at 19. 
159 Tim McCormack “The contribution of the International Criminal Court to increasing respect for 
international humanitarian law” (2008) 27 The University of Tasmania Law Review 22 at 39. See also: 
Gideon Boas “What is international criminal justice?” in Gideon Boas, William Schabas and Michael Scharf 
(eds) International Criminal Justice: Legitimacy and Coherence (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012); and 
Durham and Massingham, above n 154, at 281. 
160 Stoffels, above n 66, at 531. 
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the fact that in IAC, starvation of the civilian population is a war crime. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) 
criminalises the act of: 
 
intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions. 
 
There is no equivalent provision in the Rome Statute applicable in situations of NIAC.  
 
Notably, it is a war crime in both IAC and NIAC to:161 
 
intentionally direct[…] attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles 
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, so long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians 
or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict. 
 
These provisions are important in the protection of humanitarian assistance. They apply, 
however, only to attacks on humanitarian personnel and objects, and not to the enforcement 
of the right to access and assistance itself.162 “Attack” is not defined in the elements of 
crimes, but the Trial Chamber in Katanga defined “attack”, in the context art 8(2)(e)(i) as 
“acts of violence against the adversary”.163 Arbitrarily denying consent to humanitarian 
access, blocking relief consignments from reaching those in need, or preventing 
humanitarian personnel from carrying out their mission while leaving them unharmed, 
would not fall within this particular war crime.164  
 
  
161 Rome Statute, above n 11, arts 8(2)(b)(iii) and 8(2)(e)(iii). 
162 Wynn-Pope, above n 83, at 133. 
163 The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment) ICC Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-01/07, 7 March 2014 
[Katanga] at [798]. 
164 Rogier Bartels “Denying Humanitarian Access as an International Crime in Times of Non-International 
Armed Conflict: The Challenges to Prosecute and Some Proposals for the Future” (2015) 48 ILR 281 at 299; 
and Jokaim Dungel “A Right to Humanitarian Assistance in Internal Armed Conflicts Respecting 
Sovereignty, Neutrality and Legitimacy: Practical Proposals to Practical Problems” (2004) The Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/>. 
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Therefore, the unlawful denial of humanitarian access or assistance in a NIAC will only be 
able to be prosecuted at the ICC where the underlying act constitutes the actus reus for 
another offence. There is no precedent from either the international ad hoc tribunals or the 
ICC for the prosecution of the denial of humanitarian assistance as a war crime. In theory, 
however, it is possible that the denial of humanitarian assistance could form the basis of a 
prosecution for the crime of “violence to life and person” under art 8(2)(c)(i), “committing 
outrages upon personal dignity” under art 8(2)(c)(ii), or for a crime against humanity or 
genocide.165  
 
1 Article 8(2)(c)(i) Violence to Life and Person 
The first possibility for prosecuting the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance would 
be under art 8(2)(c)(i), under which “[v]iolence to life and person, in particular murder of 
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture” constitutes a war crime. This provision 
has its legal basis in CA 3 and the obligation to treat all those who are not participating in 
hostilities humanely.166 The provision gives murder, cruel treatment and torture as 
examples of prohibited conduct, this list however is non-exhaustive.167 Murder and cruel-
treatment are most likely to be the types of prohibited conduct under which the denial of 
humanitarian assistance could be charged.  
 
(a) Murder 
The conduct requirement for murder under art 8(2)(c)(i) requires that “the perpetrator killed 
one or more persons”.168 This can be committed by either act or omission,169 and the 
necessary intent will exist where the perpetrator acted deliberately or failed to act (1) in 
  
165 See for example: Christa Rottensteiner “The denial of humanitarian access as a crime under international 
law” (1999) 81 IRRC 552 <www.icrc.org>; Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, above n 6, at 49 – 
55; Wynn-Pope, above n 83, at 131 – 134; and Bartels, above n 164, at 299 – 305. 
166 Katanga, above n 163, at [785]. 
167 Knut Dörmann (ed) Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
– Sources and Commentary (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003) at 394. 
168 International Criminal Court Elements of Crimes (2011), art 8(2)(c)(i)-1 at element 1.  
169 Katanga, above n 163, at [786]. 
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order to cause the death of one or more persons or (2) where he or she was aware that death 
would occur in the ordinary course of events.170 Therefore, if civilians or other protected 
persons die as a result of the unlawful denial of humanitarian access or assistance, it may 
be possible that this act constitutes murder for the purposes of art 8(2)(c)(i).171 
 
In the ICRC Commentary to GC IV, Pictet discusses this possibility in the context of 
detainees unlawfully deprived of essential goods, stating that “it seems … that persons who 
gave instructions for the food rations of civilian internees to be reduced to such a point that 
deficiency diseases causing death occurred among the detainees would be held 
responsible”.172 There is however, no precedent for prosecuting the denial of humanitarian 
assistance as the war crime of murder.  The issue has to date not come before the ICC, and 
in the ICTY, while depriving inmates of food and other vital services in detention centres 
constituted the basis of the war crimes of “wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury”, “cruel treatment” and “inhuman acts”, these acts were not indicted as the basis for 
a charge of murder.173 In theory, however, where the other elements of the crime are 
satisfied, it would seem that if the denial of humanitarian assistance resulted in the death 
of those not participating in hostilities, this could form the basis of a charge of the war 
crime of murder.174 
 
(b) Cruel Treatment 
It is also possible that the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance could form the basis 
of a “cruel treatment” charge under art 8(2)(c)(i).175 The conduct requirement is that “the 
  
170 Katanga, above n 163, at [793]. 
171 Wynn-Pope, above n 83, at 134. 
172 Jean Pictet Commentary on the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952) at 597. 
173 The Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-94-2-T, 18 December 2003; The 
Prosecutor v Milorad Krnojelac (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-97-25-T, 15 March 2002; and The 
Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalíc, Zdravko Mucić (also known as “Pavo”), Hazim Delić, Esad Landžo (also known 
as “Zenga”) (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998 [Delalíc]. 
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perpetrator inflicted severe physical or mental pain or suffering upon one or more 
persons”.176  The ICC has not yet delivered a judgment which deals with this charge. The 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, however, suggests that this provision will be construed broadly. 
The ICTY has noted that cruel treatment, which has the same meaning as “inhuman 
treatment” in the context of the grave breaches provisions of the GCs, 177 is a “general 
concept” and that “no narrow or special treatment is … [to be] given to the phrase”.178 It 
must always be assessed “on the basis of all the particularities of the concrete situation”.179 
Cruel treatment encompasses the offence of torture, also indictable under art 8(2)(c)(i), but 
requires a lower level of suffering180  and does not have the same purposive requirement.181 
 
It seems possible, therefore, that depriving civilians or other protected persons of the 
necessities of life through the denial of humanitarian assistance could constitute the 
infliction of severe mental or physical pain or suffering, and therefore the crime of cruel 
treatment.182  The ICTY Trial Chamber held in Delalíc that the “creation and maintenance 
of an atmosphere of terror” in a prison camp “by itself and a fortiori, together with the 
deprivation of adequate food, water, sleeping and toilet facilities and medical care 
constitute[d] the offence of cruel treatment”.183 Again this is not precedent for the 
prosecution of the denial of humanitarian assistance per se, but comparison can be drawn 
with the underlying act of denying protected persons access to objects indispensable to 
their survival.  
 
  
176 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 8(2)(c)(i)-3 at element 1.  
177 Delalíc, above n 173, at [443]. 
178 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (also known as “Dule”) (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber II IT-94-1-T, 7 May 
1997 at [725] – [726]. 
179 Tadić, above n 178, at [724]. 
180 Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka, Milojica Kos, Mlađo Radić, Zoran Žigić and Dragoljub Prcać (Judgment) 
ICTY Trial Chamber I IT-98-30/1-T, 2 November 2001 [Kvočka et al] at [161]. 
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183 Delalíc, above n 173, at [1119]. 
  
 
36 
 
2 Article 8(2)(c)(ii) Committing Outrages Upon Personal Dignity 
The denial of humanitarian access and assistance could also constitute the basis of an 
indictment under art 8(2)(c)(ii) “committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular 
humiliating and degrading treatment”.184 In order to establish a charge under this provision 
it must be shown that (1) the perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the 
dignity of one of more persons; and (2) the severity of the humiliation, degradation or other 
violation was of such degree as to be generally recognised as an outrage upon personal 
dignity.185 
 
Exactly what constitutes an “outrage upon personal dignity” is not easy to delineate.186 The 
crime is to be construed broadly.187 As noted by the prosecutor at the ICTY, “the 
safeguarding of personal dignity was intended to be flexible enough to encompass any act 
or omission that degrades, humiliates, or attacks the integrity of the victim”.188 What must 
be shown, however, is that the treatment in question constituted an assault on a person’s 
dignity189 and caused “serious humiliation or degradation to the victim”.190 It is possible 
therefore that the denial of humanitarian assistance could form the basis of a charge under 
art 8(2)(c)(ii) where the denial degrades, humiliates or attacks the integrity of the victims.  
 
3 Crimes against Humanity and Genocide 
In addition to the war crimes provisions under art 8, it is also possible that the unlawful 
denial of humanitarian assistance could constitute the basis of a prosecution for a crime 
against humanity or genocide.   
  
184 Wynn-Pope, above n 83, at 134. 
185 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 8(2)(c)(ii) at elements 1 and 2.  
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The denial of humanitarian assistance could constitute the crime against humanity of 
murder,191 extermination,192 persecution193 or “other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health”194 where the denial was committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”.195 Of particular 
note is the crime of extermination under art 7(1)(b), which includes “the intentional 
infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine, 
calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population”.196 There is precedent 
from the ICTY which confirms that the denial of humanitarian access can constitute a crime 
against humanity. In Krstić, it was found that the blocking of aid convoys was part of the 
“creation of a humanitarian crisis as a prelude to the forcible transfer of the Bosnian Muslim 
civilians”197 and constituted the crime of inhuman acts.198  
 
Finally, it is also possible that the denial of humanitarian assistance could in some limited 
situations be prosecuted as an act of genocide. Under art 6 of the Rome Statute, genocide 
may be committed in IAC or NIAC and means:199 
 
Any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
  
191 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1)(a). 
192 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1)(b). 
193 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1)(h). 
194 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1). 
195 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1)(k). 
196 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(2)(b). 
197 The Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (Judgment) ICTY Trial Chamber I IT-98-33-T, 2 August 2001 at [615]. 
198 Krstić, above n 197, at [618] and [653]. 
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
 
Articles 6(a) – 6(c) are most likely to be relevant to the denial of humanitarian assistance.  
If the result of the denial of humanitarian assistance is that members of a particular national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group die or suffer serious bodily or mental harm as a result of 
the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance, or if the denial of assistance constituted the 
deliberate deprivation of the conditions of life calculated to bring about their physical 
destruction, it could form the basis of a prosecution for genocide. Art 6(c) is particularly 
relevant, as the Elements of Crimes detail that “certain conditions of life” may include 
“deliberate deprivation of resources indispensable for survival, such as food or medical 
services”.200 Importantly however, any of the forms of prohibited conduct under art 6 must 
be carried out accompanied by the specific intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group”.201 In extreme situations therefore, the unlawful denial 
of humanitarian assistance could form the basis of a genocide prosecution.  
 
C The Limitations of the Current Legal Regime  
 
Therefore, while there is no war crime provision in the Rome Statute specifically 
criminalising the denial of humanitarian assistance in NIAC, it is possible that such conduct 
could be prosecuted at the ICC under other provisions. The legal regime in it is current 
form, however, falls far short of establishing a robust mechanism for accountability. 
Reliance on prosecuting the denial of humanitarian assistance under the pre-existing 
provisions in arts 6, 7 and 8, rather than having a provision which specifically criminalises 
the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance as a war crime within the court’s 
jurisdiction, is problematic for a number of reasons.  
 
  
200 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 6(c) at element 4.  
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1 Limited Applicability of the Provisions 
 The first and most serious limitation of the legal regime in its current form is that while in 
some situations the denial of humanitarian assistance will be able to be prosecuted under 
existing provisions in arts 6, 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute, these provisions will not allow 
for prosecution in every situation in which humanitarian assistance is denied unlawfully. 
The scope of application of these provisions is necessarily more limited than that of a 
provision that specifically criminalises the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance. In 
order to prosecute perpetrators successfully under arts 8(2)(c)(i) or (ii), or under arts 6 or 
7, there are additional elements that must be proven, beyond simply showing that 
humanitarian assistance was denied unlawfully in breach of IHL, with the necessary 
intention and knowledge.   
 
(a) Articles 8(2)(c)(i) and 8(2)(c)(ii) 
The key limitation to prosecuting the denial of humanitarian assistance under arts 8(2)(c)(i) 
and (ii) is that both provisions are result crimes. This means that in order to successfully 
prosecute for murder under art 8(2)(c)(i), the denial of humanitarian assistance must result 
in the death of one or more protected persons.202 In order to prosecute cruel treatment under 
8(2)(c)(i), it must be shown that the denial of humanitarian assistance resulted in one or 
more protected persons suffering severe physical or mental pain or suffering.203 Finally, in 
order to prosecute for outrages upon personal dignity under art 8(2)(c)(ii), the denial of 
humanitarian assistance must have resulted in the humiliation, degradation or violation of 
dignity of one of more protected persons.204 As such, these provisions criminalise the result 
caused by the denial of humanitarian assistance, rather than the act of denial itself. This 
can be contrasted to art 8(2)(b)(xxv), which criminalises the starvation of civilians (for 
example, by impeding relief supplies) in IAC. Art 8(2)(b)(xxv) has no result requirement; 
  
202 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 8(2)(c)(i)-1 at element 1. 
203 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 8(2)(c)(i)-3 at element 1. 
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it does not need to be shown that any civilians actually starved, only that this was the 
intention of the perpetrator.205  
 
These result requirements significantly limit the situations in which arts 8(2)(c)(i) and (ii) 
may be used to prosecute the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance.  In many 
instances it will be very difficult to show that there was a direct link between the act of 
denying humanitarian assistance and a certain result, for example the death of a person or 
a group of people.206 Even where it can be shown that some individuals suffered directly 
as a result of the perpetrator’s denial of humanitarian assistance, the subsequent 
prosecution and sentence is unlikely to reflect the scale of suffering of the civilian 
population as a whole.  
 
This point is borne out clearly in the case of General Galić, the Bosnian Serb commander 
responsible for the siege of Sarajevo, which lasted nearly four years and left the population 
in “a state of medieval deprivation in which they were in constant fear of death”.207 One of 
the tactics of this siege was to impede the provision of humanitarian assistance, leaving the 
population to suffer “from widespread starvation [and a] generalised shortage of 
medicine”.208 When brought before the ICTY, Galić was not charged with any offence 
relating to the use of starvation or the denial of the necessities of life.209 Riordan opines 
that the reason for this “may be quite simple”.210 The Fenrick Report which investigated 
war crimes in the former Yugoslavia had noted that “as no one appears to have died of 
starvation, cold or dehydration in Sarajevo, it is unlikely anyone could be held liable for 
  
205 Michael Cottier “Article 8: War Crimes – Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” in Otto Triffterer 
(ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  - Observers’ Notes, Article by 
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using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare during the siege”.211 As has been noted, 
it is now clear that to prosecute starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (in IAC) at 
the ICC, it does not need to be shown that anyone actually starved, only that this was the 
intention of the perpetrator. The Galić case is an example, however, of the challenge that 
arises where accountability is dependent on a particular consequence of the unlawful denial 
of humanitarian assistance being proven, rather than the denial itself. The same issue would 
be very likely to arise where prosecution was attempted under arts 8(2)(c)(i) or (ii).  
 
The result requirement is also likely to be particularly limiting in the case of art 8(2)(c)(ii), 
where is must be shown that the perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated the 
dignity of one of more persons to such degree as to be “an outrage upon personal 
dignity”.212 While the term “outrage upon personal dignity” is not clearly delineated, 
examples in IHL sources and human rights case law provide some guidance. Examples of 
outrages upon personal dignity may include enforced prostitution,213 indecent assault,214 
and apartheid and other inhuman and degrading practices based on racial discrimination.215 
Examples from human rights case law include forms of racial discrimination,216 arbitrary 
prison practices aimed at humiliating prisoners and making them feel insecure,217 and 
subjecting female prisoners to humiliation in the form of hanging naked from handcuffs or 
being forced to maintain a certain position for long periods of time.218 The focus of the 
provision is, therefore, quite specific. The act of the perpetrator must not only cause 
suffering, but suffering which in an essential way undermines the personal dignity of the 
victim, for example through an attack on their race, ethnicity, gender or sexuality. While it 
is possible that in some instances, a perpetrator may deny a victim food or other objects 
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1993) [Fenrick Report] at [50]. 
212 Elements of Crimes, above n 168, art 8(2)(c)(ii) at elements 1 and 2.  
213 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 75(2)(b).  
214 Additional Protocol I, above n 7, art 75(2)(b).  
215 Additional Protocol II, above n 7, art 85(4)(c). 
216 East African Asians v United Kingdom (1973) 3 EHRR 76 (ECHR) at 76. 
217 United Nations Human Rights Committee Hiber Conteris v Uruguay Communication No 139/1983 
A/40/40 (1985) at [9.2] – [10]. 
218 United Nations Human Rights Committee Lucía Arzuaga Gilboa v Uruguay Communication no 147/1983 
CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) at [4.3] and [14]. 
  
 
42 
 
indispensable to their survival, in circumstances where more broadly the victim suffers 
serious humiliation or degradation, this is only likely to be a small number of instances. 
Therefore, art 8(2)(c)(ii) is only likely to provide an avenue for prosecution in very 
particular cases.  
 
(b) Crimes against Humanity and Genocide 
The prosecution of the denial of humanitarian assistance as a crime against humanity or 
genocide poses even more considerable issues in terms of the scope of applicability of the 
provisions in the Rome Statute. There are additional jurisdictional hurdles which must be 
met to bring a prosecution for either a crime against humanity or genocide. The chapeau 
elements required for an act to be a war crime are (1) the existence of an armed conflict 
and (2) a nexus between the act and the armed conflict.219 In principle, there are no other 
jurisdictional requirements or gravity thresholds which must be met. While the Rome 
Statute states that the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes “in particular 
when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes”,220 this is practical guidance for the court and the prosecutor, rather than a 
jurisdictional requirement.221 In theory therefore, an isolated act could amount to a war 
crime.222 Both crimes against humanity and genocide, however, have additional 
requirements which must be met before the ICC can exercise jurisdiction. 
 
In order to be a crime against humanity an act must be committed as “part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack”.223 Therefore, in addition to showing that the denial of humanitarian assistance was 
unlawful under IHL, it would also have to be shown that the denial was carried out as part 
of a wider pattern of conduct, which was widespread or systematic. Moreover, under the 
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223 Rome Statute, above n 11, art 7(1). 
  
 
43 
 
Rome Statute, crimes against humanity require a certain level of organisation. The act 
constituting the crime must be carried out “pursuant to or in furtherance of a state or 
organi[s]ational policy to commit such an attack”.224 The ICC pre-trial judges have been 
divided in their views as to the level of organisation necessary for a non-state actor to be 
able to commit crimes as part of an “organi[s]ational policy”.  The current view from 
Katanga is that an organisational policy may be pursued by “any group with the capability 
to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population”.225 This seems 
to require three qualities of any organisation: (1) it is a group; (2) with a defined structure; 
and (3) a shared purpose.226 This adds another threshold which must be met, over and above 
showing that IHL has been breached, in order to criminalise the denial of humanitarian 
assistance in cases where the perpetrator comes from a non-state group. Finally, and in 
respect of the crime against humanity of extermination, while art 7(1)(b) only requires the 
killing of “one or more persons”, the conduct must take place as part of “a mass killing of 
members of a civilian population”.227  
 
The crime of genocide also has additional jurisdictional requirements which must be met 
before a prosecution can be taken at the ICC. The legal concept of genocide is narrowly 
circumscribed.228 In order to prosecute the denial of humanitarian access as genocide, the 
conduct must be accompanied by the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group229 and furthermore, it must be shown that “the 
conduct took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against 
that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction”.230 As to the scale of 
the destruction, the ad hoc tribunals have opined that “[i]f a group is targeted in part, the 
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portion targeted must be significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole”.231 
In order to be prosecuted as the crime of genocide, therefore, the perpetrator must 
unlawfully impede the provision of humanitarian assistance with the specific intention to 
destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, and the conduct 
must take place within a manifest pattern of similar conduct. Thus, only in very extreme 
cases will the denial of humanitarian access or assistance constitute the crime of 
genocide.232  
 
(c) Conclusion on the Limited Applicability of the Current Legal Regime  
The possibilities for the prosecution under the current legal regime are therefore far more 
limited than they would be if there was a war crime provision which dealt specifically with 
the denial of humanitarian assistance. The current provisions under arts 6, 7 and 8 are not 
grounded in the IHL norms governing the obligations of parties in respect of the provision 
of humanitarian assistance. In order to successfully prosecute the unlawful denial of 
humanitarian assistance, additional elements must be proven, in addition to showing that 
the perpetrator breached IHL with the requisite intent and knowledge. This significantly 
limits the situations in which the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance can be 
prosecuted at the ICC, leaving a substantial gap in the accountability framework.  
 
2 The Expressive Function of International Crimes 
The second key limitation of the legal regime in its current form is that the omission of a 
provision specifically criminalising the denial of humanitarian assistance severely limits 
the ability of the Rome Statute to perform its expressive function.  
 
The function of the ICL framework is essentially an expressive one: to project a set of 
norms through trials, punishments and jurisprudence, very different to those that 
  
231 Prosecutor v Radislav Krstić (Judgment) ICTY Appeals Chamber IT-98-33-A, 19 April 20014 at [8]. 
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characterised the culture of impunity of the past.233  The inclusion of international crimes 
in instruments such as the Rome Statute is central to the performance of this expressive 
function. The criminalisation of particular conduct emphasises the seriousness with which 
the international community views such conduct and develops a sense of collective outrage 
against such violations of the law. This helps to ensure, not just legal enforcement of 
international law, but also helps to create a culture of political enforcement. The ability of 
the international community to, in no uncertain terms, label certain breaches of IHL as war 
crimes, prosecutable at the ICC, lends great mobilising power to the response to those 
violations. The omission from the Rome Statute of a provision specifically criminalising 
the denial of humanitarian assistance marks, therefore, a considerable weakness in the 
enforcement and accountability regime. At the present time, there is no expression in the 
Rome Statute, the most important instrument within the ICL framework, of the seriousness 
with which the international community considers the act of unlawfully denying 
humanitarian assistance in NIAC.  
  
Furthermore, it is only where offences are fairly labelled that the expressive function of 
international crimes can be engaged effectively. Fair labelling requires charging a 
prohibited form of conduct in a manner that best matches the alleged behaviour.234 A proper 
label for an offence reflects “both the essence and the totality of the criminal conduct”: the 
interests invaded, the gravity of the harm, the mechanisms of the injury, and the offender’s 
mental state.235 Only with a proper label will a prosecution reflect the true nature and gravity 
of the wrongdoing. With this in mind, there is a significant concern that even in situations 
where the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance can be prosecuted under present 
provisions, these prosecutions will not have the same expressive or norm-projecting effect 
as a prosecution under a specific provision.  Prosecuting the denial of humanitarian 
assistance under arts 8(2)(c)(i) or (ii) or under provisions in arts 6 or 7, will not allow for 
  
233 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, above n 228, at 37; and David Luban “After the Honeymoon: 
Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice” (2013) 11 JICJ 505 at 509. 
234 Bartels, above n 164, at 306; and Darryl Robinson “The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law” 
(2008) 21 LJIL 925 at 927.  
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an accurate expression the perpetrator’s conduct. For example, in a situation in which it 
could be shown that the denial of humanitarian assistance had resulted directly in the death 
of protected persons, the perpetrator could be charged for murder under art 8(2)(c)(i). The 
perpetrator would not enjoy impunity for their actions. A charge for murder, however, 
would still fail to act as an accurate expression of the nature and gravity of their conduct. 
Certainly, murder is an incredibly serious offence. However, the prosecution of a 
perpetrator for the death of an individual or a small number of individuals as a result of the 
denial of humanitarian assistance will in many cases fail to reflect the true scale of the 
suffering experienced by the civilian population as a whole, as well as the scale of the 
breach of IHL. This considerably weakens the system of accountability. In order to truly 
reflect the nature and the gravity of the offence, the denial of humanitarian assistance must 
be prosecuted as just that. 
 
3 Active Prosecution 
The third key limitation of the current legal regime is that, in relying on provisions which 
are not specifically focussed on the denial of humanitarian assistance for prosecution of 
these breaches, the Rome Statute fails to foster a culture of active prosecution. The function 
of a provision specifically addressing the denial of humanitarian assistance would extend, 
not just to giving expression to the seriousness with which the international community 
regards such conduct generally, but it would also signal to the prosecutor at the ICC that 
state parties consider the prosecution of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance to 
be a particular priority.236   
 
In prior conflicts, widespread and often well-documented instances of the denial of 
humanitarian assistance have not been widely used as a basis for prosecution.237 For 
example, while the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights for the Former 
Yugoslavia drew attention to the severe impacts which the interference with humanitarian 
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aid was having on the civilian population, this was never prosecuted at the ICTY.238 There 
are of course any number of reasons why this may have been the case. As has been 
discussed in the context of Galić, in some cases this may be because it is difficult to prove 
a direct relationship between the denial of humanitarian assistance and the particular 
consequences required for prosecution under result-based provisions.239 The fact that the 
denial of humanitarian assistance has not been widely used as the basis for prosecutions to 
date, however, may also be indicative of the fact that other grave violations of international 
law have traditionally been viewed as more serious and therefore a greater priority for 
prosecution.240 This possibility is disturbing, given the scale of civilian suffering in 
contemporary NIAC as a result of the unlawful obstruction of humanitarian assistance.  
 
In its current form, the Rome Statute fails to signal to those making prosecutorial decisions 
that the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance should be a particular focus. Certainly, 
the lack of a provision specifically criminalising the unlawful denial of humanitarian 
assistance is not the only factor in this pattern of a failure to prosecute, but it is an important 
one. The inclusion of a specific crime in the Rome Statute would be an important step in 
establishing the denial of humanitarian assistance as a priority for prosecution. 
 
D The Need for Reform  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the Rome Statute in its current form fails to establish a robust 
mechanism for accountability. While in some cases the denial of humanitarian assistance 
  
238 Tadeusz Mazowiecki Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Sixth periodic 
report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of 
Commission resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993  E/CN.4/1994/110 (1994) at 12 - 14; and Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia: Fifth periodic report on 
the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, 
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to paragraph 32 of Commission 
resolution 1993/7 of 23 February 1993  E/CN.4/1994/47 (1993) at [52], [66], [93] and [227]. 
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in NIAC will be able to be prosecuted under the war crimes provisions in arts 8(2)(c)(i) or 
(ii), or as a crime against humanity or in some extreme cases, the crime of genocide, the 
scope of applicability of these existing provisions is limited. There will be many instances 
of serious breaches of the IHL norms governing the provision of humanitarian assistance 
which cannot be prosecuted under the present regime. In addition to this, reliance on 
prosecuting the denial of humanitarian assistance under more general provisions also limits 
the ability of the Rome Statute to perform its important expressive function, and fails to 
encourage active prosecution. The failure to include a provision in the Rome Statute 
dealing specifically with the denial of humanitarian assistance in NIAC is a significant 
weakness in the accountability regime and results in a significant disparity between the 
protections afforded in IAC and NIAC.241 
 
V Recommendations for Reform  
 
In order to ensure an effective legal mechanism for enforcement of IHL and accountability 
for those who unlawfully deny access or impede humanitarian assistance, there is clear 
need for a new war crime provision in art 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, drafted specifically 
to address the arbitrary denial of humanitarian assistance in NIAC. This part examines what 
shape this reform should take. It discusses first what guidance can be drawn from the 2010 
reform of art 8. Secondly, it examines two key possibilities for amendment of the Rome 
Statute: the adoption of an equivalent provision to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) applicable in NIAC, or 
the drafting of a new provision.    
 
A Precedent for Reform  
 
  
241 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst, above n 228, at 274; and Lindsay Moir “Particular Issues 
Regarding War Crimes in Internal Armed Conflicts” in José Doria, Hans-Peter Gasser and Mahmoud Cherif 
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On 10 June 2010, the first amendment to the Rome Statute was adopted by consensus in 
Kampala.242 The amendment expanded the ICC’s existing jurisdiction in IAC over the war 
crimes of employing poison or poisoned weapons; employing asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials and devices; and employing bullets which 
expand or flatten easily in the human body, to also be applicable in NIAC.243 This historic 
moment concerned a modest amendment to the provisions on war crimes, but it is important 
in a number of respects: first it demonstrates that gaining consensus on reform of the Rome 
Statute is possible, secondly it shows a commitment of state parties to the principle that if 
weapons (or perhaps methods) of warfare are prohibited in IAC they should also be 
prohibited in NIAC, and finally it provides important guidance for future reform.244 
 
The success of the Kampala amendment has been put down, in large part, to its “limited … 
ambition”. 245 The amendment did not seek to create new crimes, but simply to give the 
court jurisdiction over crimes already recognised at customary international law.246 It was 
also strongly emphasised during the negotiations process that the crimes would simply 
mirror those already applicable in IAC.247 More ambitious proposals to ban weapons more 
commonly used in modern warfare such as blinding laser weapons, cluster munitions and 
anti-personnel mines were dropped.248 The experience at Kampala seems to suggest, 
therefore, that amendments to the Rome Statute, and more specifically amendments to art 
8, are most likely to be successful where they seek to codify conduct already criminalised 
at customary international law, especially where that conduct is already criminalised in 
IAC under the Rome Statute. This is important to keep in mind when considering the shape 
  
242 Amendments to Article 8 of the Rome Statute Resolution RC/Res.5, RC/11 (2010).  
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which a reform to strengthen accountability for the denial of humanitarian assistance 
should take.  
 
B Adoption of Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) in Non-International Armed Conflict 
 
The first possibility for reform is to adopt a provision identical to art 8(2)(b)(xxv), 
applicable in NIAC. Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) applies in IAC and criminalises the act of 
“intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of 
objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as 
provided for under the Geneva Conventions”.249 There are four elements to this crime: (1) 
the perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their survival; (2) the 
perpetrator intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare; (3) the conduct took place 
in the context of and was associated with an IAC; and (4) the perpetrator was aware of 
factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.250 The only 
alteration that would be required to make the provision applicable in NIAC would be to 
change the reference to “international armed conflict” in the Elements of Crimes to “armed 
conflict not of an international character”. The experience at Kampala suggests that in 
practical terms, this form of amendment would be the most likely to be successful. No new 
provision would need to be drafted as the conduct is already criminalised in IAC, and it 
can be convincingly argued that such an amendment would not seek to create a new 
international crime, but only expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to include conduct already 
criminalised at customary international law.  
 
1 Customary Status of the Criminalisation of Starvation in Non-International Armed 
Conflict 
There is widespread consensus in favour of the view that the starvation of the civilian 
population as a method of warfare in NIAC is already criminalised at customary 
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international law.251 Prima facie, the exclusion of this crime from art 8(2)(e) tends to 
suggest otherwise. Generally, where there are provisions which are only found under the 
headings of IAC in the Rome Statute, their absence in the law of NIAC can be explained 
(unless they are provisions which by their very content can apply only to IAC) by a 
legislative timidity of the drafters, preferring to exclude a criminalisation which had not 
yet reached a sufficient level of political acceptance.252 The omission of a provision 
equivalent to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) in art 8(2)(e) is particularly conspicuous, however, because 
it is not clear that it was excluded as a result of a lack of political consensus as to its 
customary status. The “starvation of civilians” as a war crime in NIAC was included as an 
option in both the draft texts produced by the 1997 and the 1998 Preparatory Committees253 
and many delegations favoured its inclusion.254 There was no specific debate as to the 
inclusion of such a provision at the Rome Conference (where discussions were focussed 
for the most part on whether war crimes for NIAC should be included at all) 255  and the 
drafting history does not provide any guidance in this respect.256 As such, it cannot be 
stated with certainty why this option was not included in the final text.257 This is significant. 
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The failure to include a provision criminalising starvation in NIAC does not necessarily 
signal a lack of customary status. 
 
In fact, there is a compelling argument that it does have such a status. Firstly, it is clear that 
the underlying prohibition on starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare 
in IHL has customary international law status. Article 14 of AP II proscribes the 
“[s]tarvation of civilians as a method of combat” in NIAC258 and the ICRC’s study of 
customary international law sets out that “the use of starvation of the civilian population as 
a method of warfare is prohibited” in both IAC and NIAC.259 The second question therefore 
is whether the violation of the IHL norm prohibiting the starvation of civilians entails 
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law in NIAC. Again, there 
is strong evidence that is does. 
 
The ICRC has stated that while the use of starvation of the civilian population as a method 
of warfare is not listed in the Rome Statute as a war crime, there is a significant body of 
state practice which highlights its serious nature, and as such “a court would have sufficient 
basis to conclude that such acts in a non-international armed conflict are a war crimes”.260 
This is a view echoed by a number of commentators.261 Firstly, there is a wealth of evidence 
to suggest that the starvation of the civilian population is viewed by the international 
community, not only as a violation of customary international law, but as a very serious 
violation.262 There is extensive state practice expressing outrage at such acts in NIAC. It is 
particularly noteworthy that the UN Commission of Experts included a breach of art 14 of 
AP II in its interim report on the “massive and systematic violations” of IHL in Rwanda.263 
Secondly, the starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare in NIAC also 
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constitutes a war crime under several national legislations, including those of Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Germany, Lithuania and Slovenia.264 
The failure of other states to criminalise the starvation of the civilian population as a war 
crime in NIAC may, in many cases, be explained by the fact that many states simply adopt 
the provisions of the Rome Statute verbatim in their national legislation. Finally, there is 
also precedent for the prosecution of the starvation of the civilian population. The 
prohibition on starvation under art 14 AP II, as incorporated in Croatian domestic law, was 
also applied by a Croatian district court in Perišić and Others.265  
 
There is a very strong argument, therefore, that the use of starvation as a method of warfare 
in NIAC is already criminalised at customary international law. This makes the chance for 
successful reform particularly promising. To adopt a provision equivalent to art 
8(2)(b)(xxv) in NIAC would simply involve adopting a provision in NIAC already 
applicable in IAC, and recognised as being criminalised at customary international law.    
 
C A Revised Provision 
 
A second, more ambitious option for reform is to draft a new provision in the Rome Statute, 
specifically criminalising the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance, independently of 
the criminalisation of the use of starvation as a method of warfare.  Certainly, the adoption 
of a provision equivalent to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) would be a significant step forward in ensuring 
accountability of those who arbitrarily deny humanitarian access and assistance. There are 
however some potential limitations to the scope of the provision, which to date has not 
been included in any indictment.266 
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1 Limited Scope of Article 8(2)(b)(xxv)? 
The crime of the starvation of civilians under art 8(2)(b)(xxv) criminalises “intentionally 
using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects 
indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for 
under the Geneva Conventions”.267 There are two key elements which must be proven: (1) 
the perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their survival; and (2) the 
perpetrator intended to starve civilians as a method of warfare.268 
 
(a) Objective Element 
In general terms, the objective element of art 8(2)(b)(xxv) does not pose any particular 
problem in regards to prosecuting the denial of humanitarian assistance. The prohibited 
conduct is that “the perpetrator deprived civilians of objects indispensable to their 
survival”.269 It is clear from the drafting process of the Elements of Crimes that “objects 
indispensable to their survival” should be construed broadly, extending beyond just food 
and water, including for example: medical supplies, basic shelter and clothing critical for 
survival.270 The act of “depriving” may be done in a number of ways and must in large part 
be interpreted in light of art 54 AP I. The perpetrator may “deprive” civilians by “attacking, 
destroying, rendering useless, or removing indispensable objects”,271 by “impeding relief 
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions”,272 or through a qualified failure 
to fulfil a duty under IHL, for example the duties on an occupying power to provide for the 
population under its control.273 These are not, however, closed categories. It is also 
important to note that there is no result requirement; it is not necessary to show that anyone 
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actually died from starvation.274 In broad terms then, the objective element of the crime 
appears well-suited to the prosecution of the denial of humanitarian assistance.  
 
Two specific concerns do arise, however, in regards to the drafting of the objective element. 
First, the reference to “civilians” is problematic. The commentary to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) makes 
it clear that “civilians” is to be read broadly; it applies to any civilian population, not just 
those finding themselves on an adverse party’s territory.275 Under IHL, however, 
humanitarian activities must benefit all persons who may be in need of assistance or 
protection. This is not limited to civilians, and must also include wounded and sick fighters, 
prisoners of war, and persons otherwise deprived of their liberty in relation to the armed 
conflict.276 These groups of people would seem to be excluded from the provision in art 
8(2)(b)(xxv), with the Trial Chamber finding in Katanga that civilians for the purposes of 
art 8(2)(c)(i) are, “persons who are not members of either State or non-state armed 
forces”.277 The provision in the Rome Statute, therefore, fails to align with the full scope 
of the underlying IHL rule. Where a perpetrator denies humanitarian access to persons who 
were not civilians, but were otherwise hors de combat, this would likely not be covered by 
a provision equivalent to art 8(2)(b)(xxv).  
 
The other concern arising from the wording of the objective element of art 8(2)(b)(xxv) is 
that in giving the example of wilfully impeding relief supplies, the statute refers to relief 
supplies “as provided for under the Geneva Conventions”. This reference to the Geneva 
Conventions is difficult, as both the prohibition of starvation and the most robust provisions 
on humanitarian assistance are found in the APs, and in the case of NIAC, in customary 
international law, rather than in the Conventions.278 Commentators generally seem to 
accept that despite this reference to the Geneva Conventions, humanitarian assistance 
provided under the provisions in the APs and customary international law could be 
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subsumed under the more general formula of “objects indispensable to their survival”.279 
It is possible this could present difficulties however, and in this respect the drafting of art 
8(2)(b)(xxv) fails to accurately reflect the full scope of the underlying rules governing 
humanitarian assistance under IHL. 
 
(b) Subjective Element 
Secondly, and more fundamentally, concern arises as to the scope of a provision equivalent 
to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) in terms of the subjective element of the crime. In order to satisfy the 
mens rea requirement, it must be shown first that the perpetrator intended to deprive 
civilians of objects indispensable to their survival.280 In addition to this, a special intent to 
starve the civilian population as a method of warfare must also be shown. While 
“starvation” is to be construed broadly, covering the deprivation not just of food and water, 
but also other objects insofar as they are vital to the civilians’ survival,281 the perpetrator 
must intend to use starvation “as a method of warfare”.282  This may prove problematic.  
 
The scope of “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare” is not 
clearly defined. Cottier’s commentary on art 8(2)(b)(xxv) explains that:283 
 
the crime must be committed with the intent to use the starvation as a method of warfare, 
that is, to deliberately provoke, increase or prolong the starvation by deprivation of objects 
indispensable for the survival with an aim to gain a military advantage.  
 
Examples given by Cottier of “military advantage” include using starvation to achieve a 
speedier subjection of a besieged town or village, or to pressure the adversary to accept 
some other aim of the attacker. Another example may be to deprive civilians of 
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indispensable goods in order to force them to move out of a certain area in order to facilitate 
control.284 
 
In many cases, the intention to use starvation as a means to gain military advantage will be 
quite clear. In Syria, for example, it is widely recognised that many of the parties to the 
conflict use siege warfare, a corollary of which is often the blocking of humanitarian 
assistance, as a means of forcing a population to surrender or suffer starvation.285 In other 
situations, however, this intention to gain a specific military advantage may be less clear, 
raising concern that this special intent requirement may limit the instances in which 
prosecution for the denial of humanitarian assistance will be available under a provision 
equivalent to art 8(2)(b)(xxv). There may be other motivations, particularly in NIAC, to 
deny humanitarian assistance which cannot be linked directly to a specific military 
advantage. For example, humanitarian assistance may be denied as a means of gaining 
political advantage, leverage at negotiations, a perceived need to protect national 
sovereignty, or driven by another motive such as ethnic cleansing. Certainly it can be 
argued that “use of starvation as a method of warfare” might be read in broader terms than 
requiring direct military advantage. The prohibition on destroying objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population under art 54(2), a corollary on the prohibition of 
starvation, states that it is prohibited to attack objects indispensable to the survival of the 
civilian population “for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value … 
whatever the motive”.286 This may suggest that a broader reading is applicable to the 
prohibition on starvation generally.287 Fleck, in the Handbook of International 
Humanitarian Law also seems to adopt a broader reading, stating that starvation of civilians 
as a method of warfare is prohibited, and “thus, deliberately to starve civilians is 
unlawful”.288 The ICRC commentary also perhaps suggests a broader reading, noting that 
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288 Dieter Fleck (ed) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 
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starvation as a method of warfare is “to provoke it deliberately, causing the population to 
suffer hunger” and that “starvation is referred to here as a method of warfare, i.e., as a 
weapon to annihilate or weaken the population”.289 It is possible therefore that so long as 
the starvation is deliberate, and not simply an unintended consequence of the armed 
conflict, this specific intent may be satisfied. 290 It is of course also true that in many cases, 
“what may seem to be an incidental effect of an armed conflict may prove to be a covert 
method of combat”.291 
 
Despite this potential for a broad reading, the problem remains that the scope of the specific 
intent to starve the population as a method of warfare remains unclear, and it is possible 
that where civilians are deprived of objects indispensable to their survival for reasons other 
than seeking to gain a direct military advantage, such conduct would not fall within this 
provision.292 In that case, the scope of the criminal provision would not accurately reflect 
the full scope of the IHL rules under which the denial of humanitarian assistance is 
unlawful, regardless of the perpetrator’s motivation.  
 
2 Customary Status of the Criminalisation of the Denial of Humanitarian Assistance  
In essence, these issues with the scope of the provision arise because art 8(2)(b)(xxv) was 
not drafted to specifically address the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance. Rather 
than being grounded in the IHL provisions governing the provision of humanitarian 
assistance, art 8(2)(b)(xxv) is grounded in the IHL prohibition on the starvation of the 
civilian population, contained in art 54 of AP I.293  The prohibited conduct is depriving 
  
289  Claud Pilloud, Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann Commentary on the 
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civilians of objects indispensable to their survival, coupled with an intention to starve 
civilians as a method of warfare. The unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance is one 
way in which this act of depriving may be carried out, but it is not the key focus of the 
provision. The reference to “wilfully impeding relief supplies” includes the IHL provisions 
governing humanitarian assistance as a kind of addendum to the criminalisation on the use 
of starvation as a method of warfare. This is a reflection of the fact that traditionally the 
rules on humanitarian assistance were viewed as a corollary to the prohibition on the 
starvation of the civilian population. There is a strong case however to argue that the 
unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance is criminalised at international law, 
independently of other underlying prohibitions in IHL, and as such should stand in its own 
provision in the Rome Statute.  
 
The underlying IHL prohibition of the arbitrary denial of humanitarian access in NIAC has 
clear customary international law status, as reflected in the ICRC study of customary 
international law,294 and there is also evidence to suggest that the criminalisation of the 
denial of humanitarian assistance, independent of the criminalisation of starvation of 
civilians, has attained customary status. There is extensive practice of both states and 
international organisations expressing outrage at the obstruction of humanitarian assistance 
in NIAC, independent of references to the IHL rules prohibiting starvation.295 In many 
cases this practice highlights the serious nature of breaches of these provisions under IHL. 
UN bodies have described the obstruction of humanitarian assistance as a “threat to 
international peace and security”296, “a serious violation of international humanitarian 
law”297, “an outrage”298 and “a threat to human life that constitutes an offence to human 
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dignity”.299 In other cases the practice condemning the deliberate impediment of relief 
consignments specifically emphasises that those who commit or order the commission of 
such acts must be held individually responsible.300 The inclusion of “wilfully impeding 
relief supplies” in art 8(2)(b)(xxv) also indicates that it is considered seriously, at least in 
IAC, despite the problems with drafting that have been highlighted. Interestingly, the 1996 
Preparatory Committee had first considered including a war crime of “starving of the 
civilian population and prevention of humanitarian assistance from reaching them” in the 
draft text of the Rome Statute.301 This was changed in the preparatory committee session 
of February 1997 however to “starvation of civilians”,302 and then in the December 1997 
session to the wording that appears in the final version of art 8(2)(b)(xxv). 303 It is clear 
then that the international community considers the unlawful denial of humanitarian 
assistance to be a particularly serious breach of IHL, and in many cases has highlighted the 
need for individual responsibility for that conduct.  
 
There is also relevant state practice at a domestic level. The vast majority of state legislation 
simply adopts the war crimes of the ICC. However, there are notable exceptions which 
focus explicitly on the denial of humanitarian assistance itself, and some of these extend to 
NIAC as well as IAC. Germany’s legislation punishes anyone who, in connection with an 
  
299 Situation of human rights in the Sudan GA Res 1996/73, A/Res/1996/73 (1996) at preamble.  
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IAC or NIAC, “impedes relief supplies, in contravention of international humanitarian 
law”.304 Norway’s Military Penal Code criminalises “anyone who contravenes or is 
accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or 
property laid down in … the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 … [and in] the two 
additional protocols to these Conventions”.305 In addition, the Draft Amendments to the 
Penal Code of El Salvador and Nicaragua’s Draft Penal Code criminalise “anyone who 
[during an international or internal armed conflict] obstructs or impedes the medical, 
sanitary or relief personnel … in the realisation of their … humanitarian tasks which, in 
accordance with the rules of international humanitarian law, may or shall be conducted”.306 
There is a strong case to argue, therefore, that the denial of humanitarian assistance in 
breach of IHL is criminalised at customary international law, independent of the rules on 
starvation.   
 
3 A Proposal 
The most desirable option for reform, therefore, would be a provision grounded solely in 
the IHL rules on humanitarian assistance, criminalising the unlawful denial of humanitarian 
access and assistance. A new provision should be inserted in art 8(2)(e) criminalising, in 
NIAC, the act of “intentionally impeding the provision of humanitarian assistance in 
contravention of international humanitarian law”.  This crime would have four elements:  
(1) The perpetrator impeded the provision of humanitarian assistance. This includes 
denying access to humanitarian actors or any other form of obstruction. 
(2) This impediment was in contravention of international humanitarian law. 
(3) The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed conflict 
not of an international character. 
(4) The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence 
of an armed conflict. 
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A specific provision of this nature would criminalise all instances of the intentional denial 
of humanitarian assistance, where that conduct is prohibited by IHL. This would 
encompass all the IHL rules governing the provision of humanitarian assistance in the GCs, 
the APs and customary international law. There would be no additional requirements or 
elements which would need to be proven beyond the breach of the underlying IHL rule and 
the requisite intention. As a result, the scope of the criminalisation would mirror the scope 
of the IHL rules governing the provision of humanitarian assistance, ensuring a robust 
mechanism for accountability. Such a provision would perform an important expressive 
function, articulating clearly the seriousness with which the international community views 
this conduct and firmly establish the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance as a 
priority for prosecution.   
 
In practical terms it may be that inserting a new provision of this nature would be more 
challenging in terms of gaining consensus than simply adopting a provision identical to art 
8(2)(b)(xxv), applicable in NIAC. However, as has been outlined there is in fact a strong 
argument to say that the criminalisation of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance 
already has customary law status. As such, state parties would not be being asked to create 
a new crime at international law, but simply to extend the jurisdiction of the ICC to include 
a crime which is already recognised at customary international law. 
 
VI  Conclusion 
 
The unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance causes significant and prolonged suffering 
of civilian populations. The numbers of those in need of humanitarian assistance as a result 
of armed conflict are unprecedented, and yet parties to conflicts routinely violate their IHL 
obligations, blocking humanitarian actors from gaining access to those in need and 
obstructing humanitarian assistance. Arbitrarily denying humanitarian access and 
depriving civilians of objects indispensable to their survival by intentionally impeding 
relief supplies is a violation of IHL. There must be accountability for such acts, and as has 
been highlighted by the Secretary-General, seeking this accountability “should be at the 
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very top of the international community’s agenda”.307 Individual criminal responsibility is 
one of the most important tools in the international community’s armoury for ensuring such 
accountability. In particular, the ICC is critical to IHL’s enforcement because of its ability 
to prosecute individuals where states are either unable or unwilling. As such, a robust legal 
framework for the enforcement of IHL and accountability for its breaches requires that the 
denial of humanitarian assistance is able to be prosecuted at the ICC. 
 
Under the current war crimes provisions of the Rome Statute, however, there is no specific 
offence under which the denial of humanitarian assistance in NIAC may be prosecuted. 
This leaves a considerable gap in the accountability framework. While in some cases the 
obstruction of humanitarian assistance may be prosecuted under other provisions in arts 6, 
7 or 8, this paper has argued that this is undesirable. These provisions are limited in their 
scope, meaning that not every instance of the unlawful denial of humanitarian assistance 
will be able to be prosecuted, and additionally these provisions do not perform their 
expressive function or encourage active prosecution as effectively as would a provision 
directed specifically at the denial of humanitarian access. 
 
If the prevailing culture of disrespect for the rules of IHL governing humanitarian 
assistance is going to be effectively challenged, reform of art 8 of the Rome Statute is 
necessary. This paper has discussed two possibilities for reform. The first option is to insert 
a provision identical to art 8(2)(b)(xxv) into art 8(2)(e), extending the court’s jurisdiction 
over the war crime of starvation of civilians in situations of NIAC. This would provide a 
considerably more robust accountability mechanism than exists presently, and given the 
lessons learnt from the 2010 reform of the Rome Statute, is likely to be the easiest to 
execute in practical terms. The second, and more desirable possibility for reform, however, 
would be to draft a new provision for insertion in art 8(2)(e) which criminalises the 
unlawful impediment of humanitarian assistance, independently of the criminalisation of 
starvation of civilians. Such a provision would be grounded solely in the underlying IHL 
prohibitions on the unlawful denial of assistance and as a result would have a scope 
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aligning directly with IHL. The consequence of this would be that where the court’s 
jurisdictional requirements are met, all instances of the unlawful denial of humanitarian 
assistance would be prosecutable at the ICC. A new war crimes provision in the Rome 
Statute would establish a robust accountability regime and offer the true possibility of an 
end to impunity.   
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